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Assistant Professor 
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The food and agriculture legislation to be enacted in 1990 will be 
the latest evolutionary step in a 58 year history of public price and 
income support for the U.S. farm sector. In keeping with this 
evolutionary process, the foundation for the 1990 legislation will rest 
upon its immediate predecessor, the Food Security Act of 1985 (FSA85). 
Because of general satisfaction with FSA85, major changes in food and 
agriculture policy are unlikely. Nevertheless, significant concerns have 
emerged. These concerns and their implications for the policy tradeoffs 
which likely will frame food and agriculture policy in the early 1990s are 
the focus of this article. 
Legacy of the Food Security Act of 1985 
Major objectives of FSA85 were to 1) relieve farm financial stress, 
2) increase exports, 3) protect land resources, especially reduce soil 
erosion, and 4) reduce the cost of farm price and income support programs 
(Congressional Quarterly, Inc.). Determining FSA85's impact on achieving 
these objectives is difficult because the limited time between enactment 
of FSA85 and debate on the 1990 legislation hinders determination of 
longer term economic effects. In addition, the severe drought of 1988 
significantly reduced grain stocks and increased farm prices, thereby 
further clouding the impacts of FSA85. 
Despite this caveat, FSA85 appears to have contributed to the 
increase in net farm income from $38 billion in 1986 to a midpoint 
estimate of $50.5 billion in 1989 (U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
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December 1989). FSA85's reduction in price support levels have lowered 
feed costs, thus improving livestock sector profits. Its large acreage 
retirement programs have curtailed the demand for purchased input and 
allowed farmers to remove their least productive land from production, 
thus improving crop sector profits. Lower prices and FSA85's export 
expansion programs have been partly responsible for an increase in 
agricultural exports from $26 billion during fiscal year 1986 to a 
forecasted $39 billion during fiscal year 1989 (USDA, December 1989). 
Last, the conservation reserve and increased land set asides have reduced 
soil erosion. Thus, FSA85 has at least partially contributed to 
attainment of objectives one, two and three. 
In contrast, as regards farm program cost, a mixed picture emerges. 
Costs have declined from approximately $26 billion in fiscal year 1986 
(Executive Office of the President) to a projected $11 to $14 billion over 
fiscal years 1990 and 1991 (Morton). These projections are consistent 
with the $12.5 billion average for fiscal years 1984 and 1985, but 
substantially exceed the $3.4 billion average for fiscal years 1980 and 
1981 (Executive Office of the President). Thus, government expenditures 
on farm programs have not increased compared to the last years of the 1981 
food and agriculture legislation, but substantially exceed those incurred 
during the last years of the 1977 legislation. 
Implications for 1990 Food and Agriculture Legislation 
The history of farm policy reveals that, while it is evolutionary, 
major steps in the evolutionary process occur when a farm policy crisis 
exists. Examples of significant evolutionary steps include: 
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1) the large grain stocks of the late 1950s/early 1960s which led to 
the replacement of mandatory supply controls by paid land 
diversions for major field crops, and 
2) the export-led price explosion of the early 1970s which led to 
the addition of direct income support through target prices to 
the traditional method of indirect income support through 
nonrecourse loan rates. 
As of late 1989, many issues have surfaced concerning food and 
agriculture policy. Some, such as planting flexibility, size and role of 
export promotion programs, cost of farm programs, and role of crop 
insurance are farm price and income support issues. Others, such as food 
safety, water quality, and research and extension funding for sustainable 
agriculture, have an environmental component. Another set revolve around 
non-price and income support issues, such as commodity checkoffs, rural 
development, and commodity donations for food assistance programs. 
While discussions continue on these issues, no farm policy crisis 
has emerged. This can be attributed largely to widespread satisfaction 
with the performance of FSA85. In addition. issues which could generate 
major changes in farm policy, such as groundwater quality, have not 
generated policy alternatives which alter the mechanisms or philosophy of 
current farm programs and enjoy wide-spread support. Specific 
difficulties confronting groundwater quality are the lack of verified 
information concerning the role of farming practices in groundwater 
contamination and concerning the impact on aggregate farm output and 
prices of wide-spread adoption of farming practices designed to reduce 
chemical use. 
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In conclusion, there is little reason to believe that major changes 
in food and agriculture policy are likely in 1990. Nevertheless, the 
composition of current farm policy actors reveals an important division. 
Specifically, the actors may be divided into two groups: those whose 
major farm policy objective is directly impacted by the price and quantity 
of farm program commodities and those whose major farm policy objective is 
concerned with distortions resulting from the historic compromise on food 
and agriculture policy. This division and its potential impact on policy 
tradeoffs in the 1990s are discussed in the remaining sections. 
Actors Concerned with the Price and Quantity of Farm Program Comaodities 
While each farm policy actor has several objectives relative to farm 
policy, each also has a clearly defined objective around which their focus 
on farm policy revolves (Table 1). Farm policy actors whose most 
important objective directly relates to the price and quantity of farm 
program commodities include program commodity producers, input suppliers, 
output handlers, users and processors, consumers, food aid advocates, and 
taxpayers. 
Program commodity producers' major farm policy objective is high 
farm income. Given production costs, high farm income is obtained through 
a combination of high prices and large production. High farm income in 
turn stimulates farmers to purchase large quantities of farm inputs. 
higher net income for farm input suppliers result. 
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Table 1: U.S. FARM POLICY ACTORS AND THEIR MAJOR POLICY OBJECTIVE(S), 
1990 FARM BILL DEBATE 
Actor 
Program Commodity 
Producers 
Input Suppliers 
Output Handlers, Users, 
and Processors 
Consumers 
Food Aid Advocates 
Taxpayers 
Environmentalists 
Exporters to U.S. 
Program Commodity_ 
Prices Quantity 
High High 
High High 
Low High 
Not High High 
Low High 
Not Low Not High 
Rural Development Advocates 
U.S. Export Competitors 
Major Objective(s) 
High Farm Income 
High Farm Input Purchases 
High Output Volume and 
Low Commodity Input 
Prices 
Safe Food at Reasonable 
Prices 
Food Access by the Poor 
Low Government Costs 
Resource Sustainability 
Access to U.S. Markets 
Increased Funding 
No U.S. Export Subsidies 
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In contrast to program commodity producers and input suppliers, food 
aid advocates and output handlers, users, and processors prefer low prices 
and high farm output. High farm output generates large throughput for 
output handlers and processors, which in turn translates into higher 
business income. Low prices mean output users and processors, including 
livestock producers, have access to low cost inputs. Given output price~ 
lower costs result in higher business income. The combination of low 
prices and high farm output also imply increased access to food by the 
poor, because of both downward pressure on food prices and increased 
likelihood of food distribution programs to help dispose of surpluses. 
The major farm policy objective of consumers has been safe food at 
reasonable prices. Consumer behavior during the last 25 years suggests 
they are more concerned with avoiding high prices than with paying low 
prices. For example. during the price explosion of the early 1970s, 
consumers become very vocal about the rising price of food. On the other 
hand, consumers in general did not lobby for lower farm price supports 
despite the substantial surpluses that existed during the 1980s. 
Consumers want to avoid high farm prices because rapidly increasing 
farm prices translate into faster inflation in the price of food than 
prices of other goods and services. As a result, discretionary spending 
must be reallocated to cover rising food costs. 
Taxpayers, the last member of this group of actors, prefer minimum 
government spending, which translates into low taxes. Expenditures on 
food and agriculture programs are lowest when farm prices and output are 
both moderate. High prices and low output generate consumer pressure for 
public expenditures to expand both production and public stocks. This 
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response was observed during the price explosion of the early 1970s. On 
the other hand, a low price/high quantity situation produces pressure from 
producers for expanded income support. The farm surpluses of the early 
and mid 1980s illustrate this policy pressure. 
Historic Food and Agricu!tur~ Policy Compromise 
These six actors have been a fixture in food and farm policy 
deliberations since the 1930s, and their interplay has defined the 
historic compromise on food and agriculture policy. The compromise 
involves: 1) protection against low farm income via nonrecourse price 
support loans and direct income payments, 2) protection against high 
commodity prices via public storage programs, 3) increased food 
availability for the domestic and foreign poor via food aid programs such 
as domestic feeding programs, food stamps, and PL480, and 4) protection 
against high budget costs by requiring farmers to remove land from 
production to qualify for farm program benefits. This compromise gives 
each of the six actors at least part of their major farm policy objective 
by providing insurance against an outcome they prefer to avoid. 
The protection against low farm income has been implemented through 
price and income support programs which distribute benefits to individual 
farmers based on their level of production and a national average price. 
Production may be current production, such as for soybeans or milk. or 
production over some historical period. such as base yields and acres for 
feed grains, wheat, cotton, and rice. The historical period has been 
periodically updated to reflect current production patterns either by a 
formula or through legislation. 
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Both tarxet prices and nonrecourse loan rates are national prices. 
The former is applied directly to all eligible production. The latter is 
adjusted at the individual county level to reflect historical 
transportation differentials between areas of surplus and deficit 
production. Thus, the price used to determine farm program benefits are 
essentially the same for all producers. Therefore, producers who receive 
the most farm program benefits are those with the highest current or 
periodically-updated historical production. 
For comparison, in a purely competitive market. such as exits for 
major U.S. farm program commodities, an individual producer can not affect 
the market price he/she receives. Thus, price is generally the same for 
all producers after being adjusted for transportation differences between 
areas of surpluses and deficits. Therefore, producers of major farm 
program commodities who generate the highest gross revenue from market 
sales are tl1ose who produce the highest quantity of production. 
The similarity in determination of an individual farmer's farm 
program benefits and gross revenue in a free market suggest that, on 
average, the distribution of farm program benefits and market receipts for 
program commodities should be approximately the same. This can be 
illustrated by the following data for 1987: 
Farm Sales 
$500,000+ 
$250,000-$499,999 
$100,000-$249,999 
$40,000 - $99,999 
$10,000 - $39,999 
$9,000 or less 
9 
Proportion of Major . 
Program Commodity Sales' 
14.75% 
24.23% 
34.21% 
18.7496 
6.99% 
1.08% 
Proportion of Total 
Direct Government 
?ayments 
10.2190 
2J .31% 
36.30% 
2J .65% 
8.89% 
1.63% 
1 Includes 1987 sales and new Commodity Credit Corporation crop loans for 
corn, wheat, rice, cotton, barley. oats, and soybeans. 
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), December 1988, page 9. 
On average, larger farms account for a slightly smaller proportion of 
direct government payments than of sales. This difference can be 
attributed in part to payment limits. 
Because gross market receipts in a free purely competitive market 
and farm program benefits under U.S. farm policy are determined by similar 
conditions on price and quantity, producers with the lowest cost of 
production generate the highest net income under both scenarios. Thus, 
over time, the most efficient producers have survived and prospered under 
U.S. farm programs just as they would under the free market. 
There are many other farm policy actors, but four are especially 
prominent at present: exporters to the U.S., U.S. export competitors, 
environmentalists, and rural development advocates. While it ls 
inappropriate lo view these actors as having a common agenda. their major 
farm policy objectives do contain a common thread. TJ1is thread is that 
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the historic food and agriculture policy compromise has generated 
distortions which directly affect their well-being. 
Exporters to the U.S. and U.S. export competitors are concerned with 
barriers to trade erected as a part of U.S. farm programs. These barriers 
include quotas on imports into the U.S. and export promotion programs. 
Quotas can be designed to raise domestic prices, such as for sugar, or to 
protect U.S. farm price support prgrams from the entry of low cost 
imports, such as for dairy products. The latter is invoked under Section 
22 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Export promotion programs lower the price of U.S. farm products in 
international trade below the level consistent wjth the domestic support 
price. The lower international price reduces export competitors' returns 
and market share. For example, the export enhancement programs enacted in 
FSA85 have negatively impacted many U.S. wheat export competitors, 
including Australia, Canada, and Argentina. 
Environmentalists are concerned that current farm policy encourages 
excessive chemical use and soil loss. Land retirement programs raise farm 
commodity prices by reducing supply. The higher prices encourage use of 
additional purchased inputs, such as fertilizers and pesticides, on the 
acreage which is planted. Increased application of chemicals may show up 
as groundwater contamination. 
A second concern is that use of historical production patterns, 
specifically base acres, to determine receipt of direct income payments 
encourages farmers to maximize program crop base acres. This discourages 
planting of crops that do not have acreage bases. The use of a more 
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diversified crop rotation, particularly one that includes hay and pasture. 
likely will reduce soil erosion and use of agricultural chemicals. 
Rural development advocates are concerned that farm programs may 
siphon funds from more encompassing rural life issues. Their concern is 
heightened by current federal budget constraints and an equity 
consideration. From 1985 through 1987, farm and off-farm income per farm 
operation averaged $37,226 (USDA, September 1989). In comparison, U.S. 
household income averaged $30,656 over this period (U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, February 1989). Furthermore, almost half of direct income support 
payments go to farms with farm sales between $100,000 and $499,999 (USDA, 
September 1989). These operations averaged $73,791 in farm and off-farm 
income from 1985 through 1987 (USDA, September 1989). Larger farm 
operations may provide income for more than one household. However, even 
if total income for farms with sales between $100,000 and $499,999 is 
divided by two, their farm household income still exceeds average national 
household income. 
Historically, most farm policy debates have involved issues and 
tradeoffs related to the historic compromise on food and agriculture 
policy: the costs of farm programs, the level of price support. the 
quantity of public stocks, and the scope of food assistance programs. In 
contrast, the issues raised by these four new actors are concerned with 
distortions generated by the historic compromise. Addressing these 
distortions will involve a new set of policy tradeoffs. 
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Policy Tradeoffs for the 1990s 
fl.!!9.~t... Const r a i 1!1_ 
Recent events in Eastern Europe suggest that military expenditures 
will be targeted for significant cuts. However, annual federal deficits 
of $150 to $161 billion over fiscal years 1987 and 1989 (Calmes), a Gramm-
Rudman deficit target of $64 billion in fiscal year 1991 (Calmes), and the 
unwillingness of American taxpayers to support higher taxes suggest 
military cuts will not be sufficient to eliminate the deficit as a primary 
legislative concern. 
Continujng budget constraints mean fund for new programs generally 
will come from current programs. Recent federal budgets have cut spending 
on farm price and income support programs, in part to pay for new 
initiatives such as anti-drug programs. Most evidence points to further 
cuts in farm programs to pay for new legislative initiatives. 
Funding for enhanced rural development efforts or for research and 
extension on issues championed by environmentalists, such as susta]nable 
agriculture, likely will come from current food and agriculture programs. 
Consequently, the debate on these new initiatives will center not only on 
their merit but also on the policy tradeoffs between actors supporting 
them and actors involved in the historic food and agriculture policy 
compromise. The latter will try to protect spending on programs which 
implement the historic compromise. 
R.~_distr ib~_ion of__f._Qrm_J:r..Q.g_ram Spend ~ng_t\moru~:. ..... Co!!!!!!odj_t_L~~ 
Environmentalist are concerned that incentives be returned for crop 
rotations while farm producers desire an increase in planting flexibility. 
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These parallel concerns could be addressed by changing crop set-asides 
from crop specific set-asides to a general farm set-aside. Under the 
latter. producers would be able to plant any crop on their land not set 
aside in government programs. This would represent a return to the normal 
cropland acreage used in the early 1970s. 
However, the planting flexibility associated with the normal 
cropland acreage is not likely to generate increased use of crop rotations 
because producers will still plant the most profitable crop. The most 
profitable crop is generally a program commodity when participating in the 
government program. unless the farm's direct government payments exceed 
the payment limit. Therefore, solving the rotation question will require 
either a reduction in target prices for program commodities or a 
redistribution of deficiency payments to other crops, including oilseeds, 
pasture. and hay. 
The redistribution of program payments would produce a gain for 
nonprogram crop producers and a loss for program crop producers. The 
price of program crops would increase while the price of nonprogram crops 
would decline as the amount of land planted to various crops shift to 
reflect the change in economic incentives. The net gain for program and 
nonprogram crop producers would depend upon the tradeoff between higher 
(lower) prices and lower (higher) government payments. In addition, the 
increased planting of hay and pasture is likely to mean less grain output. 
This would impact negatively on the welfare of output users, handlers, and 
processors. 
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Food Security 
Farm producers generally associate food security with an adequate 
supply of food, but consumers include quality of food as part of food 
security. Quality concerns have traditionally focused on sanitary 
conditions in food processing and retailing and the use of food additives. 
However, since the 1960s, quality concerns have increasingly included 
farming practices. Of specific concern has been pesticide residues on 
crops and antibiotic residues in meat. 
Recently, environmentalists have proposed another dimension to food 
security: the need for resource sustainability to insure long term 
production capability. Resource sustainability is usually associated with 
reducing the intensiveness of production by increasing the diversity in 
crop rotations, using less chemicals, and targeting· fragile lands for long 
term retirement. 
While scientific evidence is too scarce to conclude that using fewer 
chemicals and antibiotics or using a more diverse crop rotation would 
necessarily lead to smaller production, reductions are likely in the short 
run if only because of the need to adopt different technologies. Thus, 
tradeoffs are likely between higher prices/less output and food 
quality/resource sustainability. Food aid advocates and output handlers, 
users, and processors would be negatively affected while farm program 
producers wo11ld earn a higher income and taxpayers would spend less on 
farm programs. 
~-~-~L<!D.!.l)_ye1:s_u~ _ l_!l!_~}..'..!!~t ional Soyer~j _ _gn tL_Qver_ Fc~_QQ--2,Hd Farm PoJ_J~Y-
The policy distortions that affect U.S. food importers and U.S. farm 
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export competitors raise questions about sovereignty over a nation's food 
policy. Given that geographical boundaries still define political 
realities, to what extent does a country possess the sovereign right to 
assure the food security of its citizens while imposing costs u~on other 
members of an increasingly integrated world economy? This question 
becomes particularly nebulous when food security is defined to include 
food quality and resource sustainability. No matter what conclusions the 
current trade negotiations reach, this issue is likely to be a source of 
continuing international contention throughout the 1990s. 
Farm .f.rl.ce _a_nd Income~ort Enti tlement .. _Q_ri teria 
Historically, farmers have established entitlement to farm program 
benefits by setting aside the required amount of land. However. FSA85 
added a second entitlement criteria: reducing soil erosion to a 
prespecified level on highly erodible land. This entitlement criteria 
places more constraints on a farmer's private decision making process than 
has historically existed. Satisfying it will require use of certain 
production practices and exclude planting of certain crops. 
A factor that is likely to propel consideration of additional 
entitlement criteria is a fundamental change in the economic situation of 
the farm community. In 1934, approximately when farm price and income 
support programs were first enacted, the per capita income of the farm 
population was only one-third of the per capita income of the nonfarm 
population (USDA, September 1984). By the late 1970s and early 1980s. the 
latest period of time for which data is available, per capita income of 
the farm population had risen to 65-90 percent of the nonfarm population 
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(USDA, September 198·1). As previously discussed, average per farm income 
c11rrently exceeds ave1·age national household income. 
Increasingly. the question is being asked why should the public 
spend large sums of money on farmers when they are not financially 
disadvantaged. 011e answer is to add entitlement criteria that farmers 
~ust satisfy to 1·eceive farm program benefits. These new entitlement 
criteria would be designed to insure that socially desirable be1wf.i ts are 
obtained from farm programs. 
§.Y.J!!!!ill.~Y_l!_IlQ. Cond u~ i c~l}§. 
General satisfaction with the performance of the f.9.QSL_?~_U.!:..HL.~.f!. 
_qL.J_~85_ suggests that the 1990 food and agriculture legislation will 
involve only minor modifications of the 1985 legislation. However. 
numerous concerns about food and agriculture policy are being raised. 
including budgetary cost, domestic versus intnrnattonal sovereignty over 
food and farm policy. environmental issues, the definition of food 
security, the need for rural development, and the extent and nature of 
entitlement criteria. The tradeoffs which will he necessary to address 
these issues ~re unlikely to be made in the 1990 legislation, but will 
likely form the foundation for farm policy debates throughout the early 
1990s. Because of the diversity of these issues, policy actors will need 
to be extremely flexible in responding to the emergence of any one or more 
of the issues as a farm policy crisis. 
• 
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